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Abstract: Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) are incessant non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade in both intra 
and extra-African trade. New SPS measures are now set up in the African Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) that 
amalgamate three existing regional economic communities (RECs): The Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), the South African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community 
(EAC).
This article compares and contrasts the SPS measures obligations as set out in Annex 15 of the TFTA to the 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Additionally, the 
application of ‘abusive SPS measures based on minority science’ as non-tariff trade barriers to both internal and 
external African trade especially on agricultural products is analysed. An increase in transparency and 
accountability in the formulation of NTBs monitoring mechanisms in the COMESA, SADC, and EAC would 
address this ever present problem. The TFTA in Annex 15 is a case of SPS-Minus as it has a number of serious 
shortcomings including the lack of important obligations of sufficient risk assessment, non-discrimination, 
equivalence, the precautionary principle, and specific reference to consultations and dispute settlement. 
Notwithstanding these omissions, the TFTA has the potential for great achievement in the curbing of 
NTBs generally and unjustified SPS measures specifically because of the monitoring, transparency, and 
harmonisation obligations. If the Tripartite mandate, however, turns out to be like most other ‘loose’ integration 
efforts in Africa, then there is reason to believe that the NTB monitoring and reporting mechanism is not going to 
bear much fruit.
Keywords: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA), East Africa 
Community (EAC), South African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
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1. INTRODUCTION
All states have a fundamental regulatory interest in protecting their human, animal, or plant 
health or life.1 This is an important and legitimate regulatory aim, at the [African] regional 
and domestic level but ‘it rarely receives systematic and detailed attention in public debates 
and trade negotiations’2 and this is especially true as Africa regional integration has been 
described as ‘loose’ and ‘flexible.’3 This important and legitimate concern (protecting 
human, animal, and plant health or life) has to be counterbalanced with the general 
liberalisation aims of international trade. This is to ensure that these regulatory aims are not 
used as disguised protectionist measures to international trade. Marceau and Tratchman 
note, even with this noble aim in mind, that ‘the distinction between a protectionist measure-
      *   Senior Research Fellow at Criminal Justice Research Department Lithuanian Law Institute 
tomas.rudzkis@teise.org. This thematic issue (Missed and new opportunities in world trade. Eds. 
Csongor István Nagy & Zoltán Víg) was published as part of the research project of the HAS-Szeged 
Federal Markets ‘Momentum’ Research Group.
1 NicShuibhne (2006) 80; see also Alemanno (2007) 26.
2 Wagner (2017) 445–470.
3 Gathii (2010a) 608; see also Helfer (2012) 175–93.
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condemned for imposing discriminatory or unjustifiable costs, and a non-protectionist 
measure restriction trade incidentally (and thus imposing some costs), is difficult to make.’4 
This is because ‘free trade and regulatory autonomy are often at odds with each other.’5
‘The WTO is the most universal international trade body.’6 The World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) multilateral legislative function has significantly waned in recent 
years.7 Focus, for both developing and developed countries, has now shifted to bilateral and 
regional trade agreements covering a myriad of substantive areas including investment, 
domestic regulation, and surprisingly, human rights.8 Two prominent examples in Africa are 
the just concluded Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) amalgamating three existing regional 
economic communities (RECs): (the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), The Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African 
Community (EAC), and the Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) seeking to bring the 
entire continent under one umbrella free trade agreement (FTA) which is still under 
negotiation.
Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) are facially neutral governmental measures that may 
have an impact on trade.9 NTMs that act as prohibitions or restrictions on trade or NTMs 
that distort international trade without necessarily restricting it, are considered to be Non-
tariff barriers to trade (NTBs).10 The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement)11 and Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement)12 were conceived as a response to the increasing importance of NTBs 
that had supplanted tariffs, as barriers to trade, in successive negotiation rounds of GATT 
before the formation of the WTO.13 Before the SPS Agreement entered into force, ‘health 
regulations could only be justified once a prior violation of one of the GATT principles/
obligations had been found.’14 The two agreements mentioned above were also conceived 
in pursuance of maintaining an appropriate balance between protectionist measures and 
allowing States to maintain their regulatory autonomy.15
This article therefore investigates the SPS measures under the African TFTA and under 
the various RECs that constitute the TFTA. This analysis compares and contrasts these SPS 
measures to the WTO SPS Agreement. The article is divided into two broad parts. The first 
part an introduction to the African TFTA, describing its nature, origin, and geographic 
coverage. This part also discusses the legal regime on SPS measures in the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC), and Common 
  4 Marceau and Trachtman (2002) 811.
  5 Marceau and Trachtman (2002) 811.
  6 Wagner (2012) 713; Pauwelyn (2005) 2.
  7 VanGrasstek (2013) 57.
  8 Gathii (2017b) link 21.
  9 Osiemo (2015) 176.
10 Santana and Jackson (2012) 462, 475.
11 Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, WTO 
Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments– Results of the Uruguay Round, 69.
12 Agreement on Technical to Barriers to Trade, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay 
Round, vol. 31, 138.
13 Ahearn and Fergusson (2010) 3.
14 Pauwelyn (1999a) 644.
15 Marceau and Trachtman (2002).
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Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The second and final part focuses on 
Annex 15 of the TFTA covering its SPS provisions and how they compare with the SPS 
provisions of the three different RECs. This part also offers recommendations and asserts 
that SPSs are one of the major NTBs that should be addressed in both intra and extra-Africa 
trade and that the measures proposed for monitoring and reporting NTBs should be more 
transparent and accountable to enhance their legitimacy and assist in the elimination of 
NTBs. It is generally argued that, due to the intertwining nature of memberships in the 
different RECs (spaghetti bowl), the efforts at streamlining the process of monitoring, 
reporting, and eradication of NTBs in intra-African trade may be compromised.
2. THE TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE AREA: FROM CAPE TOWN-TO-CAIRO
The COMESA–SADC–EAC Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) amalgamates three existing 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs): the Eastern Africa Community (EAC),16 the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),17 and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).18 The TFTA was first conceived in 2005 and the 
Tripartite Task Force, headed by the Secretary Generals of the three RECs have met at least 
twice per year since 2006.19 On 15th June 2015, the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
Free Trade Area (TFTA) was launched in the Egyptian resort of Sharm El Sheik by the 26 
member States.20 The TFTA covers a population of 632 million and a combined GDP of 
$ 1.3 trillion.21 It covers an area that spans 17.3 million square kilometers; nearly twice the 
size of China or the United States and will represent more people than the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) or the European Union.22 The overarching objective of the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area is to contribute to the broader objectives of the African Union 
16 The Treaty Establishing the East Africa Community (EAC) was signed on 30 November 1999 
and entered into force on 7 July 2000. Its original members were Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
Burundi and Rwanda acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full members on 1 July 
2007. The Republic of South Sudan acceded to the Treaty on 15 April 2016 and become a full Member 
on 15 August 2016.
17 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed on 8 
December 1994. It replaced the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which had been in existence 
since 1981, with the objective of ultimately creating a larger market for greater social and economic 
cooperation between members and eventually resulting in a common market. The COMESA Treaty 
was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and later ratified on 8 December 1994. Its 
current members are Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
18 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1980 with 9 Member 
States, as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The SADCC was 
formed after the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration–Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation–
in 1980. The founding Member States were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
19 East African Community (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Tripartite (2017) Link 6.
20 SADC, COMESA, EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Launched, Link 15. The TFTA 
will stretch from Cape Town to Cairo, creating an integrated market with a combined population of 
almost 600 million and a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of about US$ 1 trillion.
21 Juma, Mageni (2017) link 2.
22 Bird (2017) link 11.
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(AU) – The acceleration of economic integration of the continent and achieving sustainable 
development, alleviating poverty and improving the quality of life for the people of the 
eastern, central, and southern African Region.23
It is important to note that the TFTA is not an attempt to merge COMESA, SADC, and 
the EAC at their current integration levels.24 It is instead intended that the already existing 
FTAs under the various RECs would form a wider FTA encompassing the 26 countries.
2.1 SPS Measures Existing under in SADC, EAC, and COMESA
The three RECs that form part of the TFTA had already set up their own individual SPS 
measures before the conclusion of the TFTA and launch them in 2015. SADC member 
states negotiated and adopted the SADC Trade Protocol (SACD PT) from which Annex 
VIII concerning Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures was adopted. EAC member states 
also negotiated and adopted the EAC Protocol on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
pursuant to Article 108 of the EAC Treaty,25 and Article 38 of the Protocol on the 
Establishment of the East African Customs Union.26 Both these provisions require the 
harmonisation and co-operation of the EAC member states regarding the application of SPS 
measures in the establishment of the EAC as an economic community and as a customs 
union. The COMESA member states undertook through the COMESA SPS Regulations, 
which were adopted as part of the legal framework of the COMESA Treaty, to implement 
and harmonise their SPS measures. This is the general backdrop upon which the TFTA 
negotiations were being undertaken about SPS measures. The biggest concern would 
therefore be the direct duplication, overlap, and contradiction of obligations horizontally 
among the RECs and vertically with the WTO SPS Agreement. SADC member states were 
the first to set up their SPS regime in 2000, followed by COMESA member states in 2009 
and lastly EAC member states in 2016.The following section analyses more specifically the 
three different and separate SPS regimes and compares them to the WTO SPS Agreement.
2.1.1 An Assessment of the SADC SPS Annex VIII
The SADC Trade Protocol (SADC-PT) was passed on 24th August 1996.27 It only came into 
effect on 1st September 2000 after protracted negotiations.28 The SADC-PT, according to 
the SADC Treaty,29 is ‘an instrument of implementation’ carrying the same legal force 
as the SADC treaty. The SADC-PT has the objectives of further liberalisation of intra-
regional trade in goods and services; ensuring efficient production within SADC; 
contributing towards improvement of the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign 
investment; enhancing the economic development, diversification and industrialisation 
of the region; and establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the SADC region.30 Article 16 of 
the Protocol provides the main obligations on SPS measures. SADC member states agree to 
23 East African Community (COMESA-EAC-SADC) Tripartite (2017) link 6.
24 Kalenga (2011) link 9.
25 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (As amended on 14th 
December 2006 and 20th August 2007).
26 The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (2005) link 14.
27 SADC (2017) link 15.
28 Kalenga (2004) link 13.
29 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 32 ILM 116, Article 1.
30 Southern African Development Community, (1996), SADC Protocol on Trade¸ Article 2.
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base their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations in 
order to harmonise sanitary and phytosanitary measures for agriculture and livestock 
production.31 Additionally, the provision also obliges SADC member states, upon request, 
to enter into consultation with the aim of achieving agreements on recognition of the 
equivalence of specific sanitary and phytosanitary measures, in accordance with the WTO 
SPS Agreement.32 The SADC SPS Annex was signed on 7th December 2012 and came into 
force upon approval by the SADC Committee of Ministers of Trade on 17th July 2014, in 
Gaborone, Botswana.33
It is important to note that all the member states of SADC are also members of the 
WTO. This means that the multilateral obligations stemming from the WTO SPS Agreement 
apply to them even without the more specific obligations in the SADC-PT and Annex VIII. 
The objectives of Annex VIII are to facilitate the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health in the territory of members; to enhance the member states’ implementation of the 
WTO SPS Agreement; to enhance technical capacity to implement and monitor SPS 
measures including promoting greater use of international standards and other matters 
concerning SPS; to provide a regional forum for addressing sanitary and phytosanitary 
matters and to provide a regional forum for resolving trade related sanitary and phytosanitary 
issues.34 As emphasised in the second objective of the SADC-PT, the majority of provisions 
in the Protocol correspond directly with those in the WTO SPS Agreement. Additionally, 
it is important to note that Annex VIII has two appendices, the ‘Transparency of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Regulations’ (Appendix A) and ‘Control Inspection and Approval 
Procedures’ (Appendix B). These two appendices form an integral part of the SADC Annex 
and the SADC-PT on trade.35
The core substantive provisions of the SADC-SPS Annex are largely identical in 
wording and in purpose to the WTO SPS Agreement.36 There are, however, certain specific 
differences and variances that might have serious legal implications. On the principle of 
harmonisation, the SADC member states undertook ‘where appropriate’ to work towards 
harmonisation of their respective mandatory requirements taking into account relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations.37 The wording here is at variance 
with that of the WTO SPS Agreement which requires that members ‘base their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines, and recommendations.’38 
The use of the word ‘taking into account relevant’ international standards in the SADC-SPS 
is less stringent than ‘based on’ international standard in the WTO SPS Agreement. This is 
based on the WTO Appellate Body’s view on the establishment of a presumption of 
consistency when measures are based on international standards.39 This means that SADC 
member states need not base their SPS measures on international standards if they have 
taken into account relevant international standards. This is accurate for at least the SADC 
SPS standards even though all SADC members are WTO members and are therefore bound 
31 SADC Protocol on Trade, Article 16(1).
32 SADC Protocol on Trade, 16(2).
33 Joubert (2014) 26.
34 SADC-PT, Article 2.
35 SADC-PT, Article 4.
36 Joubert (2014) 27.
37 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 6(1).
38 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 3(1).
39 Appellate Body Report on EC-Hormones, para 171.
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by the higher WTO SPS Agreement standard. Additionally, SADC member states are 
required within the limits of their resources to make every effort to participate in relevant 
international organisations and, whenever possible, if mandated, to present a common 
SADC position in these organisations to promote within these organisations the development 
of periodic review of standards, guidelines, and recommendations with respect to sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures.40
The next substantive requirement is equivalence. SADC members undertake to the 
extent practicable, without compromising their appropriate levels of SPS protection and in 
accordance with guidelines developed by the WTO SPS Committee and the relevant 
international standard setting bodies, to enter into consultations aimed at achieving bilateral 
or regional agreements on the recognition of equivalence of their SPS measures.41 This 
provision is more extensively worded than that of the WTO SPS Agreement.42 Both 
instruments, however, use the mandatory phrase; ‘shall accept’ the SPS measures of other 
member states as equivalent. This accordingly means that members have no discretion to 
refuse requests of the equivalence recognition once the inspection, test, and relevant 
procedures have been met.43An objective assessment by the importing member state and the 
exporting member state provided the importing member state provides scientific evidence 
or other information, in accordance with risk assessment methodologies agreed upon by 
both members.44 If an importing member state on a scientific basis determines that the 
exporting member state’s SPS measures does not achieve the importing member’s level of 
protection, then it may refuse to accept the SPS measures as equivalent.45 Written reasons 
should be provided in case of such refusal.46 It is important to note that the SADC-SPS 
obligation on equivalence should be read similarly, based on the language of Annex VIII, 
on the requirement of the WTO SPS Agreement that does not require ‘duplication or 
sameness’ of the measures, but ‘the alternative’ of the measure if objectively and 
scientifically proven should be acceptable.47
Additionally, Annex VIII also has the core substantive provisions of risk assessment 
and determination of the appropriate level of SPS protection.48 In making this assessment of 
risk, members are required to take into account various factors including relevant scientific 
evidence.49 This provision is similarly present in the WTO SPS Agreement which requires 
members to base their SPS measures on relevant scientific evidence as described in Article 
2 and 5 of the WTO SPS Agreement. This means that the SADC members are committed to 
taking a science-based approach when it comes to the imposition of SPS measures. This is 
true, as seen above, even in the equivalence provisions. SADC members are required to 
base their SPS measures, on an assessment and as appropriate to the circumstance of the 
risk to human, animal and plant life or health.50 These risk assessment, like that in the WTO 
40 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 6(2).
41 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 7(1).
42 Compare SADC-SPS Annex, Article 7(2) to WTO SPS Agreement, Article 4.
43 Landwehr (2007) 433.
44 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 7(2) (a).
45 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 7(2) (b).
46 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 7(2) (c).
47 SPS Committee (2004) 1.
48 SADC-SPS Annex, Article 8.
49 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(2). 
50 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(2). 
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SPS Agreement, should ‘be based on scientific principles.’51 Furthermore, SADC members 
have undertaken to follow international standards in developing their SPS measures.52 
Importantly, Annex VIII embodies the precautionary principle. SADC member states can 
depart from the strictures of risk assessment, when such a member state determines that 
the available relevant scientific evidence or other information is insufficient to complete the 
assessment.53 Such a member state may adopt a provisional SPS measure on the basis of 
available relevant information including from international standardising organizations and 
from SPS measures of other member states.54
Another key feature in the regulation of SPS measures is the precautionary principle. 
The principle made its first appearance in 1992 in environmental law under Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration.55 In international trade, the principle was introduced in Article 
5.7 of the SPS Agreement as a component of risk management.56 The precautionary 
principle is important where parties are unable to make an objective risk assessment, thus 
striking a balance between international trade liberalisation and public health protection.57 
It has the effect of allowing members to maintain provisional SPS measures where the 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient.58 Thus, a positive action, such as a ban, may be 
adopted before the existence of a risk is scientifically established.59 The provisional measure 
must be adopted on the basis of relevant information.60 The provision on precautionary 
principle under the SADC SPS Annex corresponds almost directly to the WTO SPS 
Agreement provision on the same. The purpose of the provision is the same while the 
wording is slightly different. The SADC SPS allows parties to maintain a provisional 
measure, on the basis of available relevant information, in cases where there is insufficient 
scientific information to conduct a risk assessment.61 There is a further requirement that 
members should, while applying the provisional measure, seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary to conduct an objective risk assessment.62 They are also required to 
review the provisional measure within a reasonable period of time.63 The similarity of this 
provision with the WTO SPS provision on the precautionary principle prevents any 
contradiction on the responsibilities of Member States according to the SADC SPS Annex 
and the WTO SPS Agreement. It instead has the requirement of streamlining regulation of 
SPS measures within the SADC SPS regime and the WTO SPS regime.
Furthermore, special and differential treatment is a principle that seeks to take into 
account the unique needs of developing and least developing countries, granting them 
favourable treatment in trade so as to increase their capacity to participate in in the 
global trading system.64 It aims to ensure that developing and least developing countries 
51 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(2); compare WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5(1) & (2).
52 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(1).
53 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(1), Article 8(3); compare WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5(7).
54 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8(3).
55 Laowonsiri (2010) 569.
56 Laowonsiri (2010) 569. 
57 Laowonsiri (2010) 567. 
58 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3); WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5 (7).
59 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3); WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5 (7).
60 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3).
61 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3).
62 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3).
63 SADC SPS Annex, Article 8 (3).
64 Brennan (2011) 143. 
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participate on a proportionately beneficial basis by going beyond formal guarantees of 
equality.65 Special and differential treatment is not limited to tariffs but also extends to non-
tariff issues such as extended time-frames of implementation, exemptions and flexibility 
from certain rules and technical assistance.66 The WTO SPS Agreement provides for special 
and differential treatment in favour of developing countries and least-developed countries 
(LDCs). It includes, under certain circumstances, longer time-frames for compliance, time-
limited exceptions from the obligations of the Agreement and facilitation of developing 
country participation in the work of the relevant international organisations.67 
The participation of developing and least develop countries in the work of relevant 
international organisations is to ensure that there is equality and broader representation of 
their needs and interests within these international organisations.68 The WTO SPS 
Agreement also provides for technical assistance to Members, especially developing 
country Members.69 The SADC SPS Annex, unlike the WTO SPS Agreement, has no 
provisions on special and differential treatment. This could be due to the members of SADC 
being either developing or least developed countries themselves or special or differential 
obligations were never negotiated by the least developed of SADC member states. 
The SADC SPS Annex, however, makes provisions for technical assistance to enhance the 
capacity of Member States to implement and monitor sanitary and phytosanitary measures.70 
Resource mobilisation for technical assistance under the SADC SPS Annex is a mandate to 
be facilitated by the SADC Secretariat working together with the SADC Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Coordinating Committee. The WTO SPS Agreement, unlike the SADC SPS 
Annex, mandates the Members themselves to facilitate resource mobilisation for technical 
assistance.71
In an effort to ensure transparency of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the SADC 
SPS Annex requires each Member State to ensure that a WTO SPS Enquiry Point exists.72 
The enquiry point has the mandate of providing answers to all questions from interested 
Member States on matters SPS.73 The WTO SPS Agreement similarly requires the 
establishment of enquiry points to achieve the same mandate.74 The recognition of the WTO 
SPS Enquiry Point by the SADC SPS Annex is important as it defeats the possibility of 
dual institutions conducting the same functions. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe have established national notification and enquiry points.75 
The SADC SPS Annex does not mandate Member States to establish new enquiry points. 
Instead, it recognises the WTO SPS Enquiry Points and seeks to harmonise the functions 
between the different agreements. Closely related to the management of SPS measures is 
65 Brennan (2011) 143. 
66 Committee on Trade and Development (2001).
67 SADC SPS Annex, Article 10.
68 Seibert-Fohr (2007) 510.
69 SADC SPS Annex, Article 9.
70 SADC SPS Annex, Article 12. 
71 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 9.
72 SADC SPS Annex Appendix A, Article 3.
73 SADC SPS Annex Appendix A, Article 3.
74 Article 3, Annex B, WTO SPS Agreement.
75 Gebrehwet, Ngqangweni and Kirsten (2007) 1. 
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the SPS Committee. The WTO SPS Agreement establishes the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) to act as the main administration unit of 
the Agreement to oversee its implementation.76 The SPS Committee is a regular forum at 
the WTO where member States and governments with observer status can conduct 
consultations about SPS measures that affect trade to oversee the implementation of the 
WTO SPS Agreement. Article 14 of the SADC SPS Annex establishes the SADC Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Coordinating Committee. It also requires each member state to establish 
a National Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures.77 The SADC SPS 
Coordinating Committee then compromises of two representatives of each National 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.78 The SADC SPS Coordinating 
Committee acts as a consultative forum for promoting the objectives of the SADC SPS 
Annex and strengthening cooperation between regulatory agencies.79 It is also mandated to 
promote transparency in SPS measures.80
2.1.2  An Assessment of the East African Community Sanitary &  
Phytosanitary Measures Protocol
The EAC has a current membership of 6 partner states, with the latest entrant being South 
Sudan. Article 5(2) of the Treaty establishing the East African Community states that the 
first stage of EAC integration will be the formation of a customs union.81 The EAC Customs 
Union Protocol came into force in January 2005. The Protocol has four major elements 
within its primary objective of facilitating intra and inter African trade, the fourth of which 
is the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).82 Article 38 of the Customs Union Protocol 
requires partner states to take cognizance of cooperation in sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures in order to facilitate trade in the community and among other trading partners.83 
The legal basis for the EAC SPS Protocol was also derived from the EAC Common Market 
Protocol in Article 5(2) (a),84 which requires that the partner states are to harmonise and 
mutually recognise SPS standards and technical barriers to trade. The East African 
Communities Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol that entered into force on 12th 
July 2013, provides the legal basis for reforms in the EAC that are to guarantee food safety, 
plant protection and animal health.85 The Protocol came about pursuant to Article 15186 of 
the EAC treaty that states that partner states may conclude such protocols as may be 
necessary for the area of cooperation and Articles 105 to 110 of the EAC Treaty which 
provides for partner states to cooperate in agriculture and food safety.
76 Gebrehwet, Ngqangweni and Kirsten (2007) 1. WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
(1995), Article 12. The SPS Committee has been involved in the reviewing of the SPS Agreement 
since its inception. 
77 SADC SPS Annex, Article 14 (2).
78 SADC SPS Annex, Article 14 (1).
79 SADC SPS Annex, Article 14 (5).
80 SADC SPS Annex, Article 14 (4).
81 Treaty establishing the East African Community, Amended (2007), Article 5(2).
82 East African Community Customs Union Protocol, 2005.
83 East African Customs Union Protocol, 2005, Article 38.
84 East African Community Common Market Protocol, 2010, Article 5(2) (a).
85 Kenya’s Ratification (2016) link 10.
86 Treaty establishing the East African Community, Amended (2007), Article 151.
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A reading of the objectives of the EAC Sanitary and Phytosanitary Protocol (‘The 
EAC SPS Protocol’) leads to a prima facie conclusion that it largely mirrors the WTO SPS 
Agreement, in that most of its provisions are borrowed lock, stock, and barrel from the 
WTO SPS agreement.87 The preamble of the EAC SPS Protocol takes note of the principle 
of harmonisation, for the improvement of human, animal and plant health life; the 
importance of the security and safety and free trade in agricultural products and, most 
importantly, the importance of maintaining international standards and guidelines in the 
formulation of SPS regulations.88 The EAC SPS Protocol is primarily similar to the 
provisions of the WTO SPS agreement and serves in many areas such as risk mitigation, 
transparency, coordination and harmonisation of laws to bring to life the provisions of 
the SPS Agreement. This is in the exception of some of the principles such as non-
discrimination, equivalence and risk assessment that have not been adequately addressed 
in the EAC SPS Protocol.89 The Protocol is, however, substantially in conformity with the 
provisions of the WTO SPS Agreement and that it serves to guarantee of better food safety 
measures; mitigation of risks from pests and diseases and improved competitiveness of 
produce of the EAC in relation to external markets.90 The EAC has been known to have 
focused its efforts to harmonise SPS measures and common interests through various 
working groups.91
The WTO SPS Agreement, amongst other things, enunciates the principles of 
nondiscrimination, transparency, harmonisation of laws and regulations, international 
standards and special and differential treatment to developing countries.92 It is to be noted 
that all of the members of the EAC, except South Sudan, are also members of the WTO and 
therefore are bound to the provisions of the WTO SPS Agreement. It is recognised, however, 
that even though the WTO SPS Agreement was an attempt to have a harmonized multilateral 
system of SPS measures, it noted in its preamble that these measures are often applied on 
the basis of bilateral agreements or protocols. The only given caveat is that when members 
apply measures to protect their animal plant health or food safety, that these should not 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on international 
trade.93
Article 2 of the EAC SPS Protocol to begin with, describes its objectives as promoting 
trade of food and agricultural products within the community through the implementation 
on principles of harmonisation, transparency, risk assessment, and strengthening the 
coordination of SPS measures and activities at a national and regional level within 
the community.94 In this, it is stated that partner states shall cooperate in the harmonisation 
of laws and regulations. This part is in line with Article 3 of the WTO SPS Agreement95 
which provides for harmonisation. Here, the SPS Agreement requires that the members 
base their SPS recommendations on international standards and guidelines as widely as 
possible. It should be noted that the provisions of the EAC SPS Protocol do not expressly 
87 USAID (2016).
88 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Preamble.
89 Prévost (2010).
90 East Africa Trade and Investment Hub (2016) link 7.
91 Magalhães (2010).
92 WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (1995) Preamble.
93 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Preamble; Article 1.
94 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 2.
95 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Article 3. 
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include the important aspect of basing the laws and regulations on international standards, 
but only states that the approach to be used shall be science-based and that there shall be a 
common understanding between the parties.96 This is seen, according to the author, as a 
significant shortfall, in that even though the requirement of harmonisation is present, it is 
not expressly stated in the language given in the WTO SPS Agreement which seems to be 
more wide-ranging.
Article 497 which discusses plant health, states that the partner states are to among 
other things, harmonise the inspection of certification procedures of plant and plant 
products, regulate the development and use of modified organisms and products of 
biological modification, provide a framework for management, build systems for 
surveillance in pest risk analysis, designation of pest-free areas and the areas of low 
prevalence and harmonise import and export procedures which include the registration and 
identification of plant and plant products.98 This part is seen predominantly to be in 
conformity with Articles 3, 5, 6, and 8 of the WTO SPS Agreement; however, it should be 
noted that the prospects of risk assessment (Article 5) have not been adequately laid out in 
the EAC SPS Protocol as extensively as they have in the WTO SPS Agreement.99 Article 5 
requires that the SPS measures be based on assessment of the risks to human, animal and 
plant health life based on assessment techniques in international standards and in cognizance 
of economic factors and scientific evidence.100 The provisions of the EAC SPS Protocol are 
therefore seen as somewhat of a shortfall, especially because it is only noted that there shall 
be surveillance in risk analysis. There is no mention as to whether risk assessment shall be 
pegged on scientific evidence – an issue that has been substantially controversial in this 
topic.101
On matters of animal health, Article 5 posits that the partner states shall provide 
prompt and transparent notification of the existence of animal diseases, including the 
sharing of information on the trade sensitive diseases as well as the identification of infected 
zones.102 It further goes to state in Article 5(2) (b) that there shall be the harmonisation of 
the inspection, certification and approval of butcheries, feed centres, dairies, animal 
products and feed stuff.103 It demands amongst others, that there be a standardisation of 
sanitary documents including import tariffs and veterinary certificates and similar to that in 
plant health, it requires a harmonisation of systems for registration, identification and 
traceability of animals and animal products. This part is in conformity to the WTO SPS 
Agreement provisions in Article 3, 6, 7 and 8. Article 7 of the SPS Agreement states that 
members shall notify all others of any changes in their SPS measures. The EAC SPS 
protocol stresses that there should be the sharing of information which is also in accordance 
with Article 9 of the WTO SPS Agreement on the sharing of information.
  96 Magalhães (2012) 12.
  97 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 4.
  98 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 4.
  99 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Article 5.
100 Magalhães (2012) 12.
101 East Africa Trade and Investment Hub (2016) link 7.
102 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 5.
103 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 
5 (2) (b).
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The provisions of Article 6 speak of food safety stipulating that partner states shall 
harmonize food inspection, certification and approval procedures, safety requirements for 
food coming from genetically modified organisms, surveillance systems for food-borne 
hazards in the community, import requirements and food traceability systems. There should 
also be the harmonisation of the determination of tolerance levels for additives, contaminants 
and toxins. The provisions of this part are also predominantly in conformity to Articles 3, 6, 
7 and 8 of the WTO SPS Agreement and once again go to show that the principle of 
harmonisation has been adequately catered for in the EAC SPS Agreement.
The other provisions of the agreement stipulate other important principles stipulated in 
the WTO SPS Agreement.104 In Article 7, Partner states are to designate competent 
authorities for the purposes of the protocol, while Article 8 elaborates extensively on Border 
Posts Control. Here, the protocol provides that there shall be the smooth movement of food 
and agricultural commodities within the region, joint inspection and clearance of food and 
agricultural commodities.105 Article 8 of the WTO SPS agreement speaks of control, 
inspection and approval procedures and primarily posits that the members shall ensure that 
their procedures are consistent with Annex C to the Agreement and with all the provisions 
of the agreement.
In accordance with the SPS Agreement provisions on sharing of information, the 
protocol provides in Article 9106 that there shall be cooperation of the sharing of information 
and expertise on SPS measures through the establishment of a regional information 
management system and that the states shall also jointly seek technical assistance in this 
and this is in accordance to Article 9 of the WTO SPS Agreement.107 Most importantly, 
Article 11 then requires that the partner states harmonise their policies, laws and programs, 
which is in line with Article 3 of the WTO SPS Agreement.108
On dispute settlement, Article 14 states that any disputes arising between the parties 
should be settled in accordance with the provisions of the EAC treaty. Article 11 of the 
WTO SPS Agreement, although noting that Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 
apply in disputes under the agreement, states in 11(3) that nothing shall impair the rights 
of members under other international agreements.109 It is to be noted that the provisions of 
dispute settlement may be confusing in some way, as alluded to by Magalhães, who argues 
that the redrafting of some of the articles of the WTO SPS Agreement may lead to confusion 
for instance in Article 14 on dispute settlement.110
As seen under the SADC SPS regime, the provisions on Special and Differential 
Treatment are notably absent under the EAC SPS Protocol.111 This can, however, be partly 
explained by the fact that the EAC is entirely made up of developing and least developing 
states, which are deemed to be on the same level of development according to a 2014 report 
by UNCTAD.112 This, however, begs the question what recourse a state such as South 
104 These are such as the sharing of information, inspection procedures of the various animal/
plant health life and dispute settlement among others. 
105 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 7.
106 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013).
107 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013), See Article 
9; Magalhães (2012).
108 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol, 2013, Article 11.
109 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Article 11(3).
110 Magalhães (2010) 13.
111 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Article 10.
112 UNCTAD (2014) 146.
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Sudan would have since it is classified as a least developed country.113 Article 10 of the 
WTO SPS Agreement states that members shall take into account the needs of developing 
and least developed members among them in the application and preparation of SPS 
measures. In this, for instance, longer time frames for compliance should be accorded to 
such partner states to maintain opportunities for their exports.114 The EAC SPS Protocol 
does not have anything in relation to special and differential treatment; this can be arguably 
seen as a shortfall.
2.1.3 An Assessment of COMESA SPS Measures
COMESA, as of October 2017, has nineteen member states.115 It is important to note that 
this membership does not include the Republic of South Africa and the Republic of 
Botswana, the two hegemons in Southern Africa. Somalia in the East is also not a member 
of COMESA. Additionally, among the COMESA member states, the following are not 
member states of the WTO: The Union of Comoros,116 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Sudan 
and despite their nonmembership, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Libya are observer governments in 
the WTO.117
Article 10 of the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern & Southern 
Africa (COMESA Treaty)118 vests the COMESA Council of Ministers119 with the power to 
make regulations, issue directives, take decisions and make recommendations or deliver 
opinions. The provision goes further to stipulate that a regulation shall be binding on all the 
member states in its entirety, a directive shall be binding upon each member state to which 
it is addressed as the result to be achieved but not as to the means of achieving it, a decision 
shall be binding upon those to whom it is addressed, and a recommendation and an opinion 
shall have no binding force.120 The meaning of the absolute binding nature of COMESA 
regulations has been clarified by the Legal Office of COMESA Secretariat as:
‘As for what it means when it says ‘a regulation shall be binding in its entirety’, it 
simply means that all provisions of the regulation are mandatory and Member States 
are required to comply with them. It also means that a regulation is directly applicable 
and a Member State using its own procedures has to ensure that it is domesticated. In 
some countries it does not need to be ratified. In some countries it needs to be ratified 
as a matter of course since it is already binding on the Member States by virtue of the 
Authority of the Treaty’121
113 Prévost (2010). 
114 WTO SPS Agreement (1995) Article 10. 
115 COMESA (2017) link 4.
116 The Union of Comoros is, however, in the process of acceding to the WTO and intends to 
complete the process by MC11 in December 2017 in Buenos Aires Argentina.
117 WTO (2017) link 22. 
118 Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa 33 ILM 1067 (1994) 
(COMESA Treaty).
119 The Council of Ministers is established under Article 7 of the COMESA treaty together with 
the COMESA Authority, the Court of Justice, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, the 
Intergovernmental Committee, the Technical Committee, the Secretariat, and the Consultative 
Committee.
120 COMESA Treaty, Article 10(2), (3), (4), & (5).
121 Ravelomanantsoa (2012). 
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2.1.3.1 The COMESA SPS Regulations
The Regulations on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the ‘COMESA 
SPS Regulations’) were adopted by the COMESA Council and entered into force on 9th 
December 2009.122 The COMESA SPS Regulations adopt the definitions in Annex A of the 
WTO SPS Agreement unless otherwise required by the context of the agreement.123 
COMESA SPS Regulations have three main objectives: To set out the principles and create 
mechanisms for cooperation in the implementation of the SPS measures by member states; 
the general protection of human or animal life (sanitary measures) or health or plant life or 
health (phytosanitary measures) from various risks, and to ensure that the application of the 
SPS measures does not unnecessarily hinder trade in food and agricultural products in the 
Common Market.124 These aims and objectives are similar to the general aims that are 
sought in the domestic and international regime when striking a balance between free trade 
and health protection. The Regulations, therefore, just like the WTO SPS Agreement, seek 
to strike that coveted ‘negotiated balance between the competing goals of the liberalisation 
of trade in the food and agricultural sector and the protection of health by national 
governments.125
In this analysis, it is important to note that all the COMESA member states are either 
developing states or least developing states.126 Therefore, there must be concern about the 
development dimension on meeting the objectives set out in the COMESA SPS Regulations. 
Developing and least developing countries bear a huge brunt when it comes to the innocuous 
application of SPS measures.127
On the application of the COMESA Regulations, member states have the right to take 
SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with the Regulations.128 This provision is a direct 
borrowing of the language in the WTO SPS Agreement.129 The Regulations introduce some 
of the main substantive commitments in terms of SPS by requiring that member states 
ensure that SPS measures are only applied to the extent necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, and are based on scientific principles and not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence.130 Additionally, member states commit to avoid taking any 
arbitrary or unjustified measures which could result in discrimination or disguised restriction 
on regional or international trade.131 These provisions, however, have the caveat in 
Regulation 5 on the use of the precautionary principle. There is also a direct transplantation 
of the language in the WTO SPS Agreement.132 This consequently means that the sufficiency 
of scientific standards required in the WTO SPS Agreement and the exception in the nature 
of the precautionary principle is applicable under the COMESA SPS Regulations.
122 Regulations on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, COMESA Legal 
Notice No. 310 of 2009, Official Gazette, Vol. 15, No. 5, 8 December 2009.
123 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 1.
124 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 2.
125 Paul (2003) 284–340, 339–40.
126 UNCTAD (2017a) link 19; UNCTAD (2017b) link 20.
127 Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001) 495; Henson and Rupert (2001) 85.
128 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 4(1).
129 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 2(1).
130 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 4(2).
131 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 4(3).
132 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 2(2) & 5(7).
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From this, it can been seen that the tool proposed under the WTO SPS Agreement and 
the COMESA SPS Regulations to distinguish between measures that aim at health 
protection and those that are a disguised form of protectionism is science.133 This principle, 
as shown here, is embedded in the WTO SPS Agreement. ‘The first mention of scientific 
disciplines in the SPS Agreement is found in the second and third prongs of Article 2.2, 
which require that SPS measures be based on scientific principles and not be maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in Article 5.7.’134 Interestingly, 
the finest example of the imposition of SPS measures not sufficiently based on scientific 
standards involves a COMESA member state. These are the European Communities’ (EC) 
(now European Union (EU)) measures targeted on Kenyan fish. From 1997 the EC enacted 
a series of measures against Kenyan fish. ‘The measures included new testing requirements 
and bans as a precautionary response to the outbreak of cholera in Mozambique, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania135 and due to the EC’s suspicion that Kenyan fishermen were using 
pesticide chemicals to catch fish by poisoning them.’136 ‘The EC ban was extended for a 
long period despite the absence of detectable chemical residues in the Kenyan fish exports 
and the statements by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) that the risk of transmission of cholera from commercially imported 
fish was negligible.’137
Additionally, Regulation 6 of the COMESA SPS Regulations provides that member 
states shall comply with Articles 3 to 8 of the WTO SPS Agreement. This means ‘the 
harmonisation obligation’, ‘equivalence’, ‘risk assessment and determination of appropriate 
of level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection’, ‘adaptation to regional conditions, 
including pest or disease free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence’, 
‘transparency and control, inspection and approval procedures.’ will be applied in the 
COMESA region. The interpretation offered by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
can also be applied in the case of COMESA. The fundamental obligation of basing SPS 
measures on scientific standards has been underlined in EC–Hormones by the WTO 
Appellate Body (AB):
‘The requirements of a risk assessment under Article 5.1, as well as of ‘sufficient 
scientific evidence’ under Article 2.2, are essential for the maintenance of the delicate 
and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the shared, but 
sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the 
life and health of human beings.’138
The legal implication of the transplantation of the WTO SPS obligations to all 
COMESA member states is that the multilateral obligations are now made regionally 
mandatory. This can only be said to be SPS plus when considering that at least five-member 
states (Comoros, Ethiopia, Libya, Seychelles, Sudan, and Eritrea) of COMESA are not 
WTO member states. These countries will have multilateral standards apply to them due to 
their COMESA membership. This is an SPS Plus implication only when considered from 
133 Prévost (2009) 587.
134 Prévost (2009) 587.
135 Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (1998).
136 Abila (2003); Henson and Mitullah (2004).
137 Prévost (2009) 588. 
138 Appellate Body Report, EC–Hormones, para. 177.
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the vantage point of other WTO membership. The obligations in the COMESA SPS 
Regulations cannot be applied by other WTO members against the non-WTO members but 
the fact that the non-WTO members in COMESA are bound by WTO international standards 
is a huge plus.
Moreover, the COMESA SPS Regulations139 also provide an avenue of dealing with 
the inherent scientific uncertainty in scientific inquiries, just like the WTO SPS 
Agreement.140 This is the now infamous precautionary principle. ‘At the core of the 
precautionary principle lies the notion of scientific uncertainty in situations where action or 
inaction appears warranted based on the threat of serious or irreversible damage.’141 Prof 
Wagner defines the precautionary principle in the following terms:
‘The precautionary principle is not applicable in situations where sufficient scientific 
data is available to make rational decisions in the presence of uncertainty. It is also not 
supportive of a choice to be more risk averse than implied in an international standard. 
Rather, if it is to be both meaningful and applicable in the context of international 
trade, the precautionary principle can only be applicable in situations in which 
scientific information is not available or not available in sufficient detail in order to 
make a decision. To put it another way: the precautionary principle is a tool for 
decision-making in the absence of scientific evidence.’142
2.1.3.2 The COMESA Green Pass Certification (GPC) Scheme
The most important innovation of the COMESA SPS Regulations is the establishment of 
the COMESA Green Pass Certification (GPC) scheme.143 This scheme sets the COMESA 
SPS Regulations as an example SPS-Plus regime. This does not mean that the GPC scheme 
lacks discrepancies as it is a commodity-specific SPS certification scheme and authority for 
movement of food and agricultural products within the Common market, issued by a 
National Green Pass Authority.144 The objectives of the Green Pass scheme is twofold: 
To facilitate movement and trade in food and agricultural commodities; and to protect 
human, animal, and plant health or life, and the socio-economic structures and institutions 
of member states.145 The incorporation by reference of the SPS definition in Annex A of the 
WTO Agreement in the COMESA SPS Regulations and the goal and purpose of the Green 
Pass Certification Scheme (as stated above) means that it can be asserted that the COMESA 
Green Pass Certification Scheme is intended to be a certification scheme for the combating 
of unjustified SPS measures that affect international trade among the COMESA member 
states. Ravelomanantsoa argues that the GPC scheme is intended as a SPS measure146 as it 
would be more accurate to call it a regional SPS measure set to combat the arbitrary 
imposition of SPS measures that affect international trade.
Additionally, where a member state applies to an authority to issue a Green Pass for a 
commodity or group of commodities but fails to meet the stipulated requirements for the 
139 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 5 (Interim measures).
140 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5(7).
141 Wagner (2012) 718.
142 Wagner (2012) 720.
143 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 7.
144 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 7.
145 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 8.
146 Ravelomanantsoa (2012) 21.
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commodity or group of commodities, the Secretariat may assist the member state to 
formulate a programme of interventions and source funds to address the specific deficiencies 
observed.147
An enterprise can be registered under Regulation 10(b) where it satisfies the SPS 
requirements as required for the commodity in question in the specific Council regulations, 
directives and codes of practice issued in accordance with Regulation 18.148 Regulation 18 
has provisions for mutual support and cooperation among member states.149
A reading of ‘regulations 7, 8, 10, and 12 of the COMESA SPS Regulations show that 
the GPC Scheme is a SPS measure which would be a sanitary or a phytosanitary certificate 
issued by a National Green Pass Authority to exclusively registered enterprises for the 
movement of specified food and other agricultural commodities within the Common 
Market.’150 This can be interpreted to be a harmonisation measure in the COMESA region 
that endeavours to create a single SPS regulatory regime among COMESA member states. 
The criteria for certification under the GPC scheme are like that of imposition of SPS 
measures under the WTO agreement due to the similarity of requirements in the COMESA 
Regulations to the WTO SPS agreement. There must be science-based measures and 
internationally-recognised standards for commodies and enterprises to be certified. The 
precautionary principle can also be applied in situations where there is scientific uncertainty.
Finally, there are many inconsistencies of the COMESA Regulations with the WTO 
SPS agreement that should be highlighted. Paragraph 4 of the COMESA Regulations 
preamble recognises the crucial harmonising role to be played by international bodies, 
including the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) and relevant international and regional organisations operating within the 
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention and any other organisation 
relevant to SPS measures. This is a blanket opening up of the COMESA Regulations, unlike 
the WTO Agreement, which tasks the SPS Committee with developing procedures to 
monitor the process of international harmonisation and coordination.151 The definitions 
within the COMESA Regulations omit the last limb of the WTO SPS Agreement on any 
‘measure applied to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from 
the entry, establishment or spread of pests’152 and replaces it with ensuring the protection of 
member states ‘from the socio-economic structures and institutions of a Member State from 
147 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 11(2).
148 COMESA SPS, Regulation 12(1).
149 These includes the harmonisation of national legislation in relation to SPS measures; the 
development of codes of practice, guidelines and procedures on SPS measures, including procedures 
for monitoring, surveillance, emergency preparedness, traceability, control, inspection approval, 
laboratory testing and management, certification and accreditation; the establishment of appropriate 
coordinating mechanisms amongst recognised national SPS institutions; areas of processing 
technologies, diagnosis, research and infrastructure, including the establishment and upgrading of 
national regulatory bodies or national or regional SPS related facilities; training and capacity building 
at the national and regional levels; the establishment and implementation of the necessary mechanisms 
for monitoring and surveillance, emergency preparedness and traceability of human food-borne illness 
and zoonoses, as well as, animal and plant pests and diseases; the establishment of an early warning 
system to enhance national and regional emergency response capacity and (matters of bio-safety as 
provided for under the relevant international conventions and protocols.
150 Ravelomanantsoa (2012) 22.
151 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 3(5).
152 WTO SPS Agreement, Annex A.
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risks arising from the entry, establishment and spread of pests and diseases’.153 Magalhães 
argues that this change weakens the COMESA Regulation’s protection.154 Regulation 5, 
paragraph 1 of the COMESA Regulations embodies the all-important precautionary 
principle. It excludes the term ‘relevant scientific evidence’ used in the WTO SPS 
Agreement155 and instead uses ‘sufficient scientific information’. This change of terminology 
has the potential of dangerously undermining WTO rights and obligations of member 
states.156 Under Regulation 23 of the COMESA Regulations, the dispute resolution process 
is different from that of the WTO DSB. The regulations do not mention the relationship 
between the dispute resolution process prescribed in the regulation i.e., consultations, if the 
consultations fail in 60 days a committee resolution is proffered, where a member is not 
satisfied with the committee resolution the member can submit the dispute to the COMESA 
Court of Justice for binding arbitration under Article 28 of the COMESA Treaty, and the 
WTO DSB process. This omission might cause inconsistencies when it comes to whether 
the COMESA dispute resolution process takes precedence over the WTO DSB.
2.2 Comparisons between COMESA-EAC-SADC SPS Annexes
At a glance, the COMESA, EAC and SADC Instruments on SPS measures are compli-
mentary as they each have the objective of regulating SPS. Each Instrument seeks to strike 
a balance between the protection of plant, animal and human health or life while at the 
same time pursuing the objective of trade liberalization. However, a close examination 
reveals that there are challenges and opportunities that must be explored particularly in the 
process of gearing up towards that TFTA and eventually the CFTA.157
One of the main challenges is to avoid overlap, duplication and contradiction in 
relation to the WTO SPS Agreement and SPS regimes of the different RECs. COMESA, 
EAC, and SADC SPS regimes are based on the text of the WTO SPS Agreement and draw 
considerably from the text of the Agreement.158 This practice of repeating, restating in part, 
and rephrasing selected parts of the texts of the WTO SPS Agreement leads to a situation 
where important rules and safeguards contained in WTO Agreements are amended or 
omitted.159 As a result, there is a risk of overlap and even contradiction with the WTO SPS 
Agreement, thereby limiting the rights and obligations of members under one instrument.160 
The SADC SPS regime, for example, fails to address key notions of the SPS Agreement 
such as non-discrimination, non-arbitrariness and disguised restrictions on trade whilst the 
EAC SPS regime does address some of these notions.161
There is also a risk of duplication, overlap and contradiction amongst the different 
RECs which arises because most States are members of more than one REC. Kenya for 
example, is a member of the EAC and COMESA while Tanzania is a member for 
both EAC and SADC. The confusion is further compounded by the fact that each of these 
153 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 2(b) (iv).
154 Magalhães (2010) 10. 
155 WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5(7).
156 Magalhães (2010) 10.
157 Magalhães (2010) 22.
158 Magalhães (2010) 22. 
159 Du Plessis (2017) 9. 
160 Magalhães (2010) 22.
161 Magalhães (2010) 22.
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RECs, in an attempt to mirror the WTO SPS Agreement, may arrive at different 
obligations.162 The most evident example is on the provisions on dispute settlement with 
each RECs having provisions on disputes settlement and as well as the WTO SPS 
Agreement. Therefore, in the event of a dispute, it may be unclear as to which forum a state 
is required to approach and whether their rights are limited after seeking relief in one of the 
forums.
Another issue arises in regard to the aims and objectives of the different Agreements. 
Each of the RECs has its own SPS regime and each Agreement states aims and objectives 
of the Agreement. In COMESA, the objectives are provided for under Regulation 2,163 
in EAC under Article 2164 and in SADC Article 3 provides for the objectives of the SADC 
SPS Annex.165 This gives rise to uncertainty particularly when it comes to harmonisation 
particularly because such clauses have previously yielded widely varying results.166
The relationship between voluntary and mandatory measures is ambiguous among the 
different RECs as they are not discussed in sufficient detail in some of the RECs.167
Positive attributes include additions outside the scope of the WTO SPS Agreement – 
good regulatory practice, active elimination of unjustified SPS measures or regional 
harmonisation are in order if they clearly have the objective of improving regional 
integration and boosting intra-African trade.168
3. SPS MEASURES UNDER THE TRIPARTITE  
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (TFTA)
The first part of this paper has shown that the TFTA has 27 projected member states and by 
7th July 2017, a total of 19 countries had signed Tripartite Agreement at the ministerial 
meeting in Kampala.169 At the time of writing, the TFTA Agreement in Article 22 provides 
for sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS). The member states agree on this provision 
to reaffirm their rights and obligations in respect of the WTO SPS Agreement.170 This is an 
important commitment by the TFTA members, especially the TFTA members such as 
Comoros, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Sudan, and South Sudan who are not WTO members. 
These countries are to be held to a multilateral standard through a regional scheme. This is 
accordingly an SPS-Plus commitment at least for such countries. Article 22 proceeds to 
provide that the member states shall undertake to facilitate safe trade in animals and animal 
products, plants and plant products whilst safeguarding human, animal and plant life or 
health.171 This provision is only a general obligation for the member states but should be 
attractive to other states not part of the TFTA. This is a direct corollary of having a robust 
protection system at the TFTA level. Furthermore, Article 22 requires that member states 
cooperate to eliminate unjustifiable SPS measures to facilitate safe trade in sectors of 
162 Magalhães (2010) 22.
163 COMESA SPS Regulations, Regulation 2. 
164 East African Community Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Protocol (2013) Article 2.
165 SADC SPS Annex, Article 3. 
166 Du Plessis (2017) 9.
167 Du Plessis (2017) 10.
168 Du Plessis (2017) 11. 
169 TRALAC (2017) link 18. 
170 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, Article 22(1).
171 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, Article 22(2).
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mutual economic interest.172 The provision finally, establishes a capacity building 
programme and indicates that the implementation of the provision would be according to 
the relevant annex.173
3.1 Annex 15 of the African TFTA on SPS measures
At the onset, it is important to mention that the draft annexes of the TFTA have been 
undergoing negotiation in the past years. This means that the final annex that deals with 
SPS measures might end up as a different annex once the final instrument is released. This 
notwithstanding, Annex 15 is referred to in this article as the most current draft. The SPS 
annex of the TFTA as it stands is an awful case of SPS-Minus provisions of the WTO SPS 
Agreement and the SPS obligations in the three specific RECs it constitutes; SADC, EAC, 
and COMESA. The annex has a paltry seven provisions, inadequate, by any standards, of 
the kind of objectives the TFTA seeks to achieve. It does not incorporate the progressive 
provisions in SADC, EAC, and COMESA discussed in the previous part either directly or 
by indirect reference. It is as if the TFTA was being negotiated on a tabula rasa. This is 
undesirable for the objective of progressively eliminating tariffs and nontariff barriers 
(NTBs) to trade that the TFTA aims at achieving.174 Additionally, it takes the regionalism 
advancement in Africa backwards as the desire of having a WTO consistent FTA cannot be 
achieved. This is because ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (will not be) 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories.’175
Some of the states under the TFTA are also members of the WTO. This means that the 
multilateral obligations stemming from the WTO SPS Agreement will apply to them even 
without the obligations in the TFTA-SPS Annex. The core substantive provisions of the 
TFTASPS Annex are largely identical in wording and in purpose to those of the WTO SPS 
Agreement. There are, however, certain specific provisions that are lacking or not as 
elaborative in the TFTA-SPS Annex and this may lead to serious legal implications.
The first implication is that the principle of harmonisation is one of the key provisions 
missing from the TFTA-SPS Annex. The WTO SPS Agreement requires that members 
‘base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines, and 
recommendations.’ This provision was included as the negotiators of the SPS Agreement 
aimed to reduce unnecessary trade impacts of national SPS measures by promoting greater 
convergence of the risk regulatory requirements applied by members. One would think that 
one of the aims of the TFTA-SPS Annex would be to reduce unnecessary trade impacts of 
RECs SPS measures, but it seems it was not.
Another implication is that members of WTO, trading in the same product, are required 
to accept sanitary and phytosanitary measures of other members as equivalent. This is the 
embodiment of the principle of equivalence. The exporting member needs to objectively 
demonstrate to the importing member that its measures achieve the importing member’s 
appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection. The WTO SPS Agreement 
does not require ‘duplication or sameness’ of the measures, but ‘the alternative’ of the 
172 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, Article 22(3).
173 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, Article 22(4); 22(5).
174 Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, Article 5(a).
175 GATT 1995, Article XXIV (8) (b).
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measure if objectively and scientifically proven should be acceptable. By failing to include 
this obligation, TFTA member states that are neither WTO members nor COMESA members 
may find themselves without the obligation of equivalence. Even though it may be argued 
that this obligation can be traced in the other RECs’ obligations, an inclusion in the TFTA-
SPS annex would settle the issue once and for all.
A significant omission is that the TFTA-SPS Annex lacks provisions on risk assessment 
and determination of the appropriate level of SPS protection. Contrastingly, the WTO SPS 
Agreement requires members to base their SPS measures on relevant scientific evidence as 
described in Articles 2 and 5 of the WTO SPS Agreement. WTO members are required to 
base their SPS measures, on an assessment and as appropriate to the circumstance of the 
risk to human, animal and plant life or health. This was introduced as harmonisation would 
not be feasible in all cases. Where members’ SPS measures cannot be harmonised because 
no international standard exists, or some members opt for more stringent regulations, the 
SPS Agreement requires that such national measures have a scientific basis. Thus, science 
plays an important role in establishing the boundaries of permissible SPS risk regulation. 
A member introducing SPS measures is required to bring forward scientific evidence which 
supports the existence of a threat and is specific to the risk of concern. On what basis will 
the TFTA member states base their measures on and how will they justify the measures? 
Could this lead to imposition of SPS measures that will only be barriers to trade? Even with 
the specific SPS on the RECs it is difficult to see how such an important obligation would 
be absent from the TFTA-SPS annex.
Furthermore, the precautionary principle is only incorporated in the WTO-SPS 
Agreement. Member states as stated earlier, can depart from the structures of risk 
assessment. Such a member state must determine that the available relevant scientific 
evidence or other information is insufficient to complete the assessment. The member state 
may then adopt a provisional SPS measure on the basis of available relevant information 
including international standardising organisations and SPS measures of other member 
states. Applying precautionary measures for a temporary period is considered part of the 
risk management. Upon additional information being obtained for a more objective risk 
assessment, members are required to review the measures. The discretion member states 
have to impose precautionary measures may result into either legitimate trade restrictions or 
abuse by states. The Author would venture to argue that perhaps this is the reason why it 
was left out in the TFTA-SPS Annex. It is, however, important to note that the precautionary 
principle has become so intertwined to most SPS-Plus regional obligations that it is difficult 
to fathom that it would be excluded from the TFTA-SPS regime.
Finally, the WTO SPS Agreement provides for special and differential treatment in 
favour of developing countries and least-developed countries. Special and differential 
treatment as seen before is a principle that seeks to consider the unique needs of developing 
and least developing countries, granting them favourable treatment in trade so as to increase 
their capacity to participate in the global trading system. The TFTA-SPS Annex, unlike the 
WTO SPS Agreement, but similarly to the SADC, EAC, and COMESA SPS regimes has no 
provisions on special and differential treatment. This could be, as previously argued, due to 
the fact that the TFTA covers African most if not all are developing or least developed 
countries.
The annex does not take into account the positive provisions in the three RECs it seeks 
to amalgamate into one single FTA. If the provisions of the SADC, EAC, and COMESA 
are anything to go by, the TFTA annex is a far cry from what would have been expected 
430 HARRISON O. MBORI
were the provisions in the three RECs to be merged through a process of systemic 
harmonisation. Specifically, The TFTA in Annex 15 is a case of SPS-Minus because of 
number of serious shortcomings: lack of important obligations on sufficient risk assessment, 
non-discrimination, equivalence, the principle of precaution, and specific reference to 
consultations and dispute settlement. The drafters of the annex did not take into account the 
progressive provisions set out in the SADC protocol and its Annex VIII, the EAC SPS 
Protocol, and the COMESA SPS Regulations. With these shortcomings in mind and the 
problem of multiple and overlapping memberships in the current RECs terrain in Africa 
still present, it can be easily seen why the author reaches the inevitable conclusion that the 
TFTA SPS regime is SPS-minus.
4. CONCLUSIONS
NTBs generally and unjustified SPS measures specifically remain a serious threat to the 
liberalisation of trade in Africa. Most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are dependent 
on agricultural trade as a focal point of their export earnings so the process of identification, 
monitoring and elimination of unjustified SPS measures is important in both intra and extra 
African trade. The difficulties encountered by SSA countries in effective participation in the 
WTO have had an impact on how developed nations have been able to use SPS measures 
for protectionist purposes. The best way to address this is greater capacity building among 
SSA countries with assistance from developed nations.
This article has analysed the SPS measures under three different RECs: SADC, EAC, 
and COMESA. This was followed by an assessment of the TFTA-SPS measures and found 
that important obligations on risk assessment, harmonisation, and equivalence have been 
left out. This omission will have far reaching implications on the liberalization generally, 
and the elimination of NTBs in intra and extra African trade. These shortcomings, the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) has the potential for great achievement in the curbing of 
NTBs generally and unjustified SPS measures specifically if stronger measures on 
monitoring, transparency, and harmonization obligations are enhanced. The process of 
regionalism in Africa has made it difficult to deal with unjustified SPS standards as African 
states are members of different RECs which have intertwining standards creating a 
‘spaghetti bowl.’ The augmentation of some of the mechanisms for the identification, 
monitoring, and elimination of NTBs is highly welcome. The COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite mandate is a good example of how this process has begun in Africa. A lot, 
however, remains to be done to foster free trade in Africa that has the potential of eradicating 
poverty through wealth and employment creation.
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